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TESTING MINIMALISM: A REPLY
Cass R. Sunstein *

Some judges are less ·ambitious than others; they have minimalist ten
dencies. Minimalists are unambitious along two dimensions. First, they seek
to rule narrowly rather than broadly. In a single case, they do not wish to
resolve other, related problems that might have relevant differences. They
are willing to live with the costs and burdens of uncertainty, which they tend
'
to prefer to the risks of premature resolution of difficult issues. Second,
minimalists seek to rule shallowly rather than deeply, in the sense that they
favor arguments that do not take a stand on the foundational debates in law
and politics. They prefer incompletely theorized agreements, by which diverse
people, from their different perspectives, can unite behind modest rather than
immodest theorizing. 2 They believe that such agreements recognize the diffi
culty of resolving foundational debates, and that they also allow people,
including judges, to show one another a large measure of mutual respect.
In p rominent cases, some judges favor minimalism, and others do not.
Justice O'Connor, for example, has often shown a preference for case-by
3
case judgments that leave the most difficult questions for another day.
4
Justice Scalia, by contrast, is no minimalist. He endorses an ambitious
theory of constitutionalism-"originalism"-and he often uses that theory
5
to decide cases. Much of the time, he prefers to rule broadly rather than
narrowly, because of his preference for rule-bound judgments that give
clear guidance for the future. Of course minimalism and maximalism
should be seen as relative rather than absolute. Justice O'Connor is a
minimalist, much of the time, but she does not always follow a minimalist
path, and even when she does, she does not say that her rulings are limited
to people with the same initials as the parties to the particular litigation.
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E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 80 (2003):

The pragmatic judge tends to favor narrow over broad grounds of decision in the early stages
in the development of a legal doctrine.... What the judge has before him is the facts of the
particular case, not the facts of future cases. He can try to imagine what those cases will be
like, but the likelihood of error in such an imaginative projection is great.Working outward, in
stages, from the facts before him to future cases with new facts that may suggest the desirabil
ity of altering the contours of the applicable rules, the judge avoids premature generalization

2.
( 1995).

See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1733

3.

See, e.g. , Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558, 579-85 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring);

City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64--69 ( 1999) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 736-38 ( 1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring).

4.

See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cm.L. REV. 1175 (1989).

5.

See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849 (1989).
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Justice Scalia has maximalist tendencies, but he does not try, in a single
equal protection case, to resolve all imaginable equal protection cases.

I am extremely grateful to Neil Siegel for his generous and careful
6
analysis of my claims about minimalism and the Supreme Court. Siegel
7
offers three objections to those claims. First, he contends that minimalism
has not been precisely defined, and that the presence of diverse and incon
sistent definitions makes it difficult to test the claim that any particular
court, or any particular decision, is minimalist in character. Second, Siegel
claims that the most usable definition of minimalism is palpably inconsis
tent with Court's behavior during the 2003 term (and probably more
generally). Third, he contends that minimalism, suitably defined, is unattrac
tive, among other things because it violates the Supreme Court's roles as
guide and as guardian. These are instructive objections. But the disagree
ment between Siegel and me is smaller (more minimal!) than it appears, and

I hope that a few clarifying remarks will help to illuminate both the nature
and the uses of the minimalist project.

I. MINIMALISMS
What is minimalism? Let us begin with three distinctions. First, proce
dural minimalism entails an effort to limit the scope and ambition of judicial
rulings; procedural minimalism should be distinguished from what I call
minimalism 's substance, which entails an identifiable set of substantive
8
commitments (to, for example, fair procedures and the rule of law). Second,
procedural minimalism as a general category should be distinguished from
the subcategory of democracy-forcing minimalism, which involves an effort

to issue narrow rulings that do not mandate ultimate outcomes but that force
9
decisions by politically accountable actors. The Court might, for example,
refuse to resolve a hard constitutional problem and rule more narrowly that
Congress must authorize an intrusion on constitutionally sensitive inter
10
ests. Third, denials of certiorari and justiciability doctrines, by which the
Court refuses to reach the merits, should be distinguished from narrow and
incompletely theorized judgments, by which the Court resolves the merits

6.
Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of a Court, and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at the
Supreme Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1951 (2005).
He focuses on CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME (1999) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN,
7.
ONE CASE AT A TIME] and Cass R. Sunstein, Op-Ed, The Smallest Court in the Land, N.Y. TIMES,
July 4, 2004, § 4 (Week in Review), at 9 [hereinafter Sunstein, The Smallest Court]. I discuss mini
malism at various points in CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREMIST RIGHT-WING
COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA (forthcoming 2005).
8.
See SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 7, at 61-68. In particular, see the sug
gestion that it is ;;important to distinguish between minimalist procedure and minimalist substance:•
Id. at 61.
9.
10.

Id. at 24-36.
See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
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but without much foreclosing the future.

11
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When the Court denies certiorari,

or holds that a decision is unreviewable, it is adopting a form of procedural
minimalism, but that form is importantly different from narrow and incom
pletely theorized judgments. I hope that I made these distinctions adequately
in earlier writings, but very possibly not; Siegel is certainly correct to insist
on their importance.
Siegel's principal concern, and mine as well, is procedural minimalism
in the form of narrow and incompletely theorized rulings. Quoting from a

2004 op-ed of mine, Siegel suggests that procedural minimalism requires
12
courts to decide "the largest issues of the day . . . as narrowly as possible."
Hence he offers a testable hypothesis, to the effect that a decision is mini
malist if it involves an "intentional choice by a majority of the Justices . . .
to decide a case on the narrowest and shallowest grounds reasonably open to
them, even though broader and deeper rationale(s) were reasonably avail
13

able."

Siegel should certainly be commended for offering a testable hypothesis,
as I did not. He is right to say that there is a great deal of room for empirical
work on the Supreme Court's uses of minimalism. But I never meant to sug
gest that members of the Court pursue minimalism with the intensity and
rigor suggested by Siegel's hypothesis. To be sure, it is possible to imagine a
set of judges, or perhaps even a court, taking the trouble to identify the pos
sible rationales for certain decisions and consistently selecting the narrowest
and less ambitious of these. But no real-world court is likely to act in this
way; and for reasons that Siegel identifies, such a court would be nothing to
celebrate, if only because it would give so little guidance for the future. A
court of this kind would tum minimalism into a kind of dogma or theology.
It would not use minimalism on the intensely pragmatic grounds that some14
•

•

times support 1t.

When I suggest that the current Supreme Court (often) favors proce
dural minimalism, then, I mean to say only that in the most difficult and
controversial domains, the Court tends to choose relatively narrow and
15
The Court has not accepted a large-scale theory

unambitious grounds.

of constitutional interpretation; it proceeds by building cautiously on
precedent, in the fashion of common law courts. Unfortunately, my
claim-that

11.

minimalists

prefer

relatively

narrow

and

unambitious

See SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 7, at 39-41.

12.

Siegel, supra note 6, at 1954 (quoting Sunstein, The Smallest Court, supra note 7).

13.

Siegel, supra note 6, at 1963.

14. See SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 7, at 46--60. Note, in the spirit of
Siegel's critique, that a decision that is both wide and deep might also leave many issues undecided.
Consider, for example, a decision to the effect that people have a constitutional right, on autonomy
grounds, to avoid "undue burdens" on their medical choices. Courts that leave things undecided
after broad and ambitious rulings should not be treated as minimalist.
15.
Siegel identifies this possibility. Siegel, supra note 6, at 2016. He adds that the sugges
tion that the Court favors "reiatively narrow and shallow holdings" is "less clearly inaccurate," and
notes that this claim could be tested empirically. Id. at 2019. I agree.
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grounds-is not entirely easy to test empirically. To test that claim, it
would be necessary to identify a large number of cases, to specify the
possible grounds for decision, and to see how often the Court selected
narrower grounds in the face of competing possibilities. It would also be
necessary to specify what counts as minimalism along all relevant di
mensions, and to decide how to count a decision in which minimalism
along one dimension (say, avoiding the merits) produces maximalism
along another dimension (say, through a wide ruling on standing). A
great deal of coding would be necessary by people with internal under
standing of the relevant cases. Notwithstanding the difficulties, there is a
great deal of room for empirical testing of minimalism. In the absence of
empirical work, I can suggest only that in many of the most prominent
cases in recent years, the Court has rejected both width and depth. Siegel
16

himself offers a number of examples.

II. MINIMALISM FALSIFIED?
As I have said, Siegel understands minimalism in absolute rather
than relative terms, as involving an intentional decision "to decide a case
17
on the narrowest and shallowest grounds reasonably open to " the Court.
He explores a number of decisions from the October 2003 term to see
whether the Court was minimalist in that sense. He finds that if this is the
right account of minimalism, the Court has not consistently followed it.
Consider a few examples. In Blakely v. Washington,18 the Court did
refuse to decide the validity of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, but
that should be unsurprising; what matters is that the Court could have
ruled on the Sixth Amendment question in a way that was more narrowly
9
limited to the facts. In McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,1 the
Court left many issues undecided and generally avoided width, but it did
not rule on the narrowest possible grounds, especially in its expansive
20
understanding of "corruption" in politics. Siegel agrees that the Court
pursued a fairly minimalist path in Locke v. Dave/1 and Tennessee v.
23
Lane,22 though more in the latter case than in the former. But he does
not find minimalism in two of the Court's most eagerly awaited deci
sions, Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow24 and Rumsfeld v.
16. See Siegel, supra note 6, at 1978-82; see also SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra
note 7, at 76-205.
17.

Siegel, supra note 6, at 1963.

18.

542 U.S. 296 (2004).

19.

540 U.S. 93 (2003).

20.

Id. at 223-24.

2 1.

540 U.S. 712 (2004).

22.

541 U.S. 509 (2004).

23.

Siegel, supra note 6, at 1978, 1980.

24.

542 U.S. 1 (2004).
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5
Padilla. 2 He acknowledges that Newdow, refusing to resolve the constitu
26
tionality of the Pledge of Allegiance, was in a sense minimalist, but he
thinks that Padilla, involving a merits-avoiding procedural ground, an
nounced a broad (procedural) rule with large implications for other
27
issues.
•

In a series of instructive discussions, Siegel convincingly shows that, in
a number of cases in the 2003 term, the Court did not rule in the narrowest
imaginable way. But is that big news? Let us identify a continuum of possi
ble outcomes, from a denial of certiorari, to a refusal to reach the merits, to
a fact-bound decision that goes barely beyond the immediate parties, to a
decision that states an identifiable if narrow rule with an identifiable if shal
low rationale, to a decision that offers an identifiable but broad rule, and so
on, culminating in a truly maximalist (if also unfathomable) decision that
resolves all questions for all time by reference to the most fundamental of
principles. Focusing on the 2003 term, Siegel makes a special target of my

2004 op-ed, which, to be sure, does not analyze minimalism in much detail.
But the essential claims in that little op-ed may nonetheless hold. In New
dow, the Court did refuse to assess the Pledge of Allegiance on the merits.
In Padilla, the Court did refuse to rule on the merits of an exceptionally con
troversial issue of presidential authority; the same is true of the Cheney
28
29
case. In cases involving sexually explicit materiai
and enemy combat
30
ants, the Court did say more than was strictly speaking "necessary," but it
also showed a tendency toward both narrowness and shallowness insofar as
it deliberately refused to resolve some of the key questions raised by the
31
litigants.
Siegel's most interesting point, it seems to me, is that a decision that is
minimalist along one dimension may be wide or deep on another. If a court
invokes a procedural ground to avoid the merits, that very ground might be
ambitiously reasoned or apply to a wide range of problems not before the
Court. Siegel is right to emphasize this possibility. He is also right to iden
tify many ways during the 2003 term in which the Court failed to choose the
narrowest possible rationale for its decision. But I wonder if that is the ap
propriate test of the minimalist hypothesis. Notwithstanding a regrettably
loose phrase in an op-ed ("as narrowly as possible"), those who find strong
minimalist tendencies in the Supreme Court are inclined to think that Siegel
may have mounted an attack, illuminating to be sure, on a strawman.

25.
542 U.S. 426 (2004). The case is discussed in Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War,
2004 SUP. Cr. REV. 47.
26.

Siegel, supra note 6, at 1982.

27.

Id. at 1985.

28.

Cheney

29.

Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004).

v.

v.

United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367 (2004).

30.

Hamdi

31.

For detailed discussion, see Sunstein, supra note 25.

Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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III. Is MINIMALISM BAD?
Siegel dislikes minimalism; he believes that it is normatively unattrac
tive, because it leaves so much uncertainty. He emphasizes that "often it is
critical that the Court provide guidance, either to the lower courts or to the
32
political process." Objecting to the uncertainty introduced by Rasul v.
34
35
33
Bush, Newdow, and Lane, he thinks that the Court should try to provide
clear rules for others, so as to reduce aggregate decision costs. Siegel fears
that minimalist decisions often leave important problems to lower courts,
not to citizens and their representatives, and to that extent such decisions do
not promote democratic goals. He believes that the Supreme Court is a
guardian as well as a guide, and he insists that it is appropriate for constitu
tional theory to specify the areas in which ambitious rulings are justified,
even when those rulings reject the outcomes of political processes.
I am not sure how much Siegel and I disagree on the normative ques
tions. I have not argued, and I do not believe, that minimalism is generally
36
or always the right path. When planning is important, minimalism is haz
ardous; when minimalism imposes high decisional burdens on others, the
argument for minimalism is weakened. Hence minimalism must be evalu
ated in terms that have become familiar from the rules-standards debate in
37
many domains of the law. If it is desirable for the Supreme Court to leave
decisions to lower courts, it is partly because lower court decisions are less
final, and a degree of percolation can occur there at the same time that de
liberative debate takes place within the citizenry as a whole. In the end
Siegel and I agree that the argument for minimalism is strongest in an iden
tifiable class of cases: those in which American society is morally divided,
those in which the Court is not confident that it knows the right answer, and
those in which the citizenry is likely to profit from more sustained debate
38
and reflection.
If Siegel and I have a normative disagreement, it is because he is more
confident than I am about what he calls "the Supreme Court's role-and
comparative advantage-in our constitutional system of separate but interre
39
-0
lated powers." Invoking Brown v. Board of Education,4 which he labels
41
"heroic, " he emphasizes that as compared to other institutions, "the Justices
32.

Siegel, supra note 6, at 2003.

33.

Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).

34.

Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).

35.

Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).

36.

See SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 7, at 54-60.

37.
38.
2016.

See id. at 57-60.
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 7, at 59, 257-58; Siegel, supra note 6, at

39.

Siegel, supra note 6, at 2015.

40.

347 U.S. 483 ( 1954).

41.

Siegel, supra note 6, at 20 15.
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are more insulated from the pressures of majoritarian politics and therefore
42
better equipped to protect minority rights. " This is of course a plausible
43
and time-honored view, defended in whole or in part by the early Bickel,
45
44
Dworkin, and Ely. Certainly it is easy to find cases in which the Court's
insulation served the nation well. But if we are going to celebrate Brown,46
1
we had better not forget about Dred Scott v. Sandfor£ or Lochner v. New
York48 or Coppage v. Kansas49--or, for that matter, United States v. Morri

son,50 Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents," City of Boerne v. Flores,52 Board

of Trustees of the Univ ersity of Alabama v. Garrett,53 Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena,54 and Gratz v. Bollinger.55 The Court's conception of what prin
ciple requires, and its understanding of what it means to defend "minority
rights, " should not be taken as unerring. From the moral point of view, insu

lation from majoritarian pressures is sometimes the problem, not the
solution.
But good minimalists do not mean to attack the structure of judicial re
view. They mean to insist instead on Learned Hand's suggestion, in the
midst of World War II, that "[t]he spirit of liberty is that spirit which is not
56
too sure that it is right . . . . " In many of its best moments, the Rehnquist
57
Court has respected that spirit, not least in decisions involving free speech,
60
59
58
sex equality, the war on terrorism, and even federalism. In its own small
way, minimalism can be heroic too.

42.

Id.

43.

ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).

44.

RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).

45.

JoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).

46.

Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

47.

60 U.S. 393 (1857).

48.

198 U.S. 45 ( 1905).

49.

236 U.S. 1 (1915).

50.

529 U.S. 598 (2000).

51.

528 U.S. 62 (2000).

52.

521 U.S. 507 ( 1997).

53.

531 U.S. 356 (2001).

54.

515 U.S. 200 (1995).

55.

539 U.S. 244 (2003).

56.
LEARNED HAND, The Spirit of Liberty, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND AD
DRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 189, 190 (Irving Dillard ed., Alfred A. Knopf 1952).
57.
Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 518
U.S. 727 ( 1996).
58.

United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).

59.

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).

Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003); Solid Waste Agency v. United
60.
States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
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